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1. Introduction
The introduction of academy schools to English education is turning out to be one of the most 
radical and encompassing programmes of school reform seen in the recent past amongst 
advanced countries. Unlike traditional community schools which are run by local authorities, 
academies are autonomous, state-funded schools that are managed and run outside the control of 
local authorities. In almost all cases, they are conversions of already existing predecessor 
schools and so they inherit pupils already enrolled in the school. They are school takeovers 
which, because of their nature, enable more autonomy in operation than in their predecessor 
state.1 At the time of writing, nearly 2000 of England's secondary schools (or about 63 percent
of schools) and a further 2300 (about 15 percent) of primary schools had become academies.2 
The vast majority became academies after a change of government in May 2010 quickly ushered 
in the 2010 Academies Act, a legislative change that widened the academies remit.3
School reforms that have taken place in many countries in the recent past – notably free 
schools in Sweden, and charter schools in the US - have proven to be an important dimension of 
the changing education landscape. Change has occurred in the context of some reforming 
nations being innovative in their attempts to get closer to what they perceive to be the optimal 
1
 They are different from most US charter schools which are typically, though not always, set up from scratch. A 
closer comparison to the typical charter school in England is the free schools which are a recent addition to the 
education landscape and are new schools (often set up by parent or community groups).  The closer US comparison 
to academies is ‘in-district’ charters where an already existent public school is converted to a charter as a school 
takeover – these are less commonplace than US charters as a whole, but there are places where conversions of 
public schools to charters have taken place (like Boston and New Orleans – see Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2014). 
2
 In England, secondary schooling takes place from ages 11-16 and primary schooling from ages 5-11. 
3
 Prior to the Act only secondary schools could become academies and to convert they were required to sign up a 
sponsor. Afterwards, primary schools were permitted to become academies, free schools were introduced and a 
sponsor was no longer required for conversion to take place. See Eyles, Hupkau and Machin (2015) for more 
details. 
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school type. At the same time in other countries education policies have been pursued with little 
deviation from the orthodox model of the traditional local or community school.4 
The genesis of the English academies programme is what we study in this paper. The 
academy school model was initiated under the 1997-2010 Labour government when strong 
concerns were being expressed that schools in particular local authorities (usually serving urban 
inner-city disadvantaged neighbourhoods) were not delivering a good enough education to the 
children attending them. A widespread recognition emerged that something needed to be done, 
both to try to improve educational standards, and to confront significant behavioural problems, 
in these schools where it had been said that ‘teachers had lost control of the corridors’. The 
proposed solution was to replace an existing school with a new type of state school to be run 
outside of local authority control and which was managed by a private team of independent co-
sponsors. The sponsors of the new academy school delegate the management of the school to a 
largely self-appointed board of governors who have responsibility for employing all academy 
staff, agreeing levels of pay and conditions of service and deciding on the policies for staffing 
structure, career development, discipline and performance management. 
We study the causal impact of academy school conversion on pupil intake and pupil 
performance. This line of enquiry is aimed at working out how the Labour academy programme 
functioned and impacted on pupils affected by the policy. To do so we consider data on pupils in 
schools over the school years 2000/01 to 2008/09 since this facilitates a before/after analysis of 
the impact of academy conversion.5 Of course, as the discussion has already made clear, it was
pupils in disadvantaged schools that participated in academy conversion and so we need to 
4
 This is nowhere better illustrated in the cross-country differences highlighted in discussions of what kinds of 
schools do better or worse in the international test score data that has been a key resource in recent economics of 
education research (see OECD, 2011, or Hanushek and Woessmann, 2011). 
5
 The school year in England runs from September through July. 
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define a credible control group of pupils attending schools that did not become academies in the 
sample period. We do so by comparing outcomes of interest for children enrolled in academy 
schools to pupils enrolled in a specific group of comparison schools, namely those state schools 
that go on to become academies after our sample period ends. We discuss the rationale for the 
empirical credibility of this and our methods in using this research design (together with threats 
to convincingly achieving identification) in more depth below. It turns out that this approach 
produces a well-balanced treatment and control group that differences out key observable and 
unobservable factors linked to conversion to academy status. 
Because pupil composition may change before and after conversion to an academy, 
robust study of the causal impact of academy conversion on pupil performance needs to utilise 
an empirical strategy that is not contaminated by such change. The approach taken in this paper 
is to study performance effects for pupils who were already enrolled in the school prior to 
conversion and are then affected by academy conversion in subsequent years of their secondary 
schooling. Since the initial enrolment decision was made for the pre-conversion school, 
academy conversion should be exogenous to these students, and can be set up as in terms of an 
intention to treat empirical exercise, from which we can obtain a causal estimate of a local 
average treatment effect. In this setting, the intention to treat group is all pupils enrolled in the 
predecessor school who, irrespective of whether they actually do, are pre-conversion in line to 
take their year 11 KS4 exams in the school. The approach has similarities to that taken in 
Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014), who study school takeovers in New Orleans, referring to pupils 
who stay in a converting school as ‘grand-fathered’ pupils. 
Whilst we study a school transformation programme that is different in a number of 
dimensions to those that have been implemented elsewhere in the world, our work fits well with 
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two strands of economics of education research. The first is a growing literature that presents 
empirical estimates of the impact of school types on pupil achievement. For example, US work 
on charter schools tends to find achievement gains associated with charter status, and with the 
‘injection’ of charter school features to public schools.6 In the UK, a small body of work has
identified the impact of specific school types on educational and labour market outcomes.7 The
second is a bigger and by now fairly long established literature on school types in the US and 
elsewhere. These include many studies on Catholic schools, on voucher-subsidised private 
schools and many analyses of the impact of school types using international test score data.8
In the next section, we discuss the structure of the secondary schooling system in 
England and document the rise of academies in the period we study. We also present a brief 
summary of related studies. Section 3 describes the data and the research designs we implement. 
Section 4 presents the main results on the effects of academy conversion on pupil intake and 
performance. We also report a number of robustness tests of our key findings. Section 5 hones 
in on mechanisms through studying the use of academy freedoms that underpin the reported 
results. We then offer conclusions to the paper in section 6. 
6
 This literature is not without its own controversy. Recent, typically small scale, experimental evaluations of 
charters in or near particular US cities (Boston and New York) find positive impacts on educational achievement 
(see Abdulkadiroglu et al. 2011, 2014; Angrist et al. 2013; Dobbie and Fryer 2011; Hoxby and Murarka 2009). 
Wider coverage non-experimental evaluations produce more mixed results (Center for Research on Education 
Outcomes, 2009). On the injection of charter school features to public schools in Houston, and their beneficial 
effects, see Fryer (2014). 
7
 See, for example, the Clark (2009) paper on schools becoming devolved from local authority control in the late 
1980s and early 1990s or the work on private schools by Green et al. (2012). 
8
 See, for example, Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005), Neal (1997) or Evans and Schwab (1995) for analysis of US 
Catholic schools or Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) for an analysis of the private school voucher programme in Chile. 




Academies were first introduced to English education in the early 2000s. In hindsight, their 
introduction can be viewed as a key development in the history of education in England.9 This is 
firstly because changes in school type like those that have taken place for academies, and the 
scale of the academies programme, are rarely seen in education systems across the world. 
Secondly, the academies programme has been promoted and pursued with almost evangelical 
fervour by advocates, and run down with an equal lack of enthusiasm and stark criticism by 
detractors. Lord Adonis’ (2012) book eloquently describes this. Adonis was the key player in 
government in setting up the Labour academies programme, and the more sceptical lines from 
those who oppose academies10 make the controversial nature of the debate clear. 
The first clutch of academies opened in the school year beginning in September 2002. 
Academies are independent, non-selective, state-funded schools that fall outside the control of 
local authorities. In most cases, they are conversions of already existing predecessor schools. 
Academies are managed by a private team of independent co-sponsors. The sponsors of the 
academy school delegate the management of the school to a largely self-appointed board of 
governors with responsibility for employing all academy staff, agreeing levels of pay and 
conditions of service and deciding on the policies for staffing structure, career development, 
discipline and performance management. 
Secondary School Types in England and Academy Introductions 
There are seven different school types that make up the English secondary education 
system: independent schools, academy schools, city technology colleges (CTCs), voluntary 
9
 It is only England, and not in the other nations of the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales) 
who run their own devolved education systems , where academies have been introduced. 
10
 For example, the anti-academies alliance (see the website at http://antiacademies.org.uk). 
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aided schools, foundation schools, voluntary controlled schools and community schools. Each 
school type is characterised by a unique set of features regarding their autonomy and 
governance. This is shown in Table 1. In the Table the different school types are ordered by the 
amount of autonomy that their governing body/management body has, ranging from those with 
the most (private fee-paying independent schools that operate outside of the state sector) to 
those with the least (community schools that are largely operated under the remit of local 
authority control). 
In the time period we study prior to the Academies Act of 2010 (which altered the 
definition of academy status in some important ways), the main impetus of the programme was 
to replace failing schools with academies with aim of generating school improvement by 
moving away from the conventional school type that had populated the English secondary sector 
in the past.11 The path to establish an academy school in a local authority involved a number of
steps. The key feature was the need to sign up a sponsor, who worked with the local authority 
(LA) where the school operates, and to complete a formal expression of interest (this made the 
case that an academy in the proposed area was both needed and feasible). The phase is 
completed when the LA and sponsor send the expression of interest to the Secretary of State for 
Education for his or her ministerial approval. After approval the process moves on to the 
feasibility stage and beyond that to actual conversion of the already existing school to an 
academy. 
Table 2 shows the numbers of state-maintained English secondary schools of each 
school type in operation at the start and end of the eight year period beginning in the school year 
11
 There were some other cases, for example where schools that already had more autonomy than a typical state 
community school became an academy, or as a means for fee-charging independent schools to broaden their intake 
of pupils by becoming academies (Department for Children, Schools and Families 2007), but as the numbers 
discussed below will show, these were the exception rather than the norm. 
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2001/02. The Table shows that by the 2008/09 school year, there were 133 academies open and 
operating. These had a gradual introduction, with the first three opening in the 2002/3 school 
year, and then in the subsequent school years as follows:  2003/04 - 9; 2004/05 - 5; 2005/06 - 
10; 2006/07 - 20; 2007/08 - 36; 2008/09 - 50. The Table shows reductions in the other 
secondary school types as the share of academies rose to a share of 4 percent of the secondary 
sector by 2008/09. 
In Table 3, we look in more detail at which types of school converted to academy status. 
The upper panel of the Table shows information on all schools that became academies, whilst 
the lower panel shows information on the school conversions on which we have full data 
available pre- and post-academy conversion. The main differences between the samples in the 
upper and lower panel is the small number of new academies (twelve of them), for which there 
is no predecessor school, and the five conversions from independent schools, for which we do 
not have  predecessor school data. 
Table 3 shows that that (at least) one school from every secondary school type converted 
to become an academy. However, the majority of conversions occurred in community schools - 
the ‘typical’ state school operating with the lowest levels of autonomy as outlined in Table 1. In 
the period we study, for the seven cohorts of converting academies we have data on 106 schools, 
and there are two cohorts of schools (comprising a total of 114 schools) that were approved to 
become academies, but their conversion occurs after the sample period ends in 2008/09.12
Related Literature 
Whilst there is quite a lot of research on the impact of different school types on pupil 
enrolment and performance, there is much less that studies what happens when the type of 
12
 For inclusion in our analysis, the approval of ‘future’ academies had to have taken place before May 2010, when 
the government changed and the new coalition introduced the Academies Act. 
8 
school attended by pupils changes. One study related this paper (albeit from an earlier time 
period, and in a rather different setting) is the analysis of grant-maintained (GM) schools13 by 
Clark (2009) in England in the late 1980s and early 1990s. He utilises a regression-discontinuity 
design that exploits the fact that schools wishing to become GM schools were required to win 
the support of the parents with children who were enrolled at the school. He finds that the 
narrow GM vote winners experienced a significant improvement in pupil performance (of 0.25 
of a standard deviation) compared to the narrow GM vote losers. Thus the change in school type 
brought about performance improvements. 
In the US, the body of work on charter schools is relevant because, at least in some 
dimensions, charter schools have similarities to academies. Most (although not all) charters are 
new schools and so in this dimension the relevance is reduced. The more convincing studies in 
the charter school literature exploit the fact that some schools use lotteries to allocate places 
when the school is oversubscribed. Examples of this kind include: Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011), 
who estimate the impact of charter attendance on student achievement using Boston data; 
Hoxby and Murarka (2009), which evaluates the effect of charter schools in New York City on 
their students’ test scores; and Angrist et al. (2010), who evaluate the impact of a specific 
Charter School (in Lynn, Massachusetts) that is run by the Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP) 
and is targeted at low income and minority students. 
The smaller number of studies of conversions of already existing schools to charters (as 
in the study of school takeovers in Boston and New Orleans by Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2014), or 
the introduction of practices used in charters to US public schools (as in Houston schools 
studied by Fryer, 2014) are of more direct relevance to the English case of academies. Some of 
13
 GM schools were renamed as foundation schools (see Table 1) in the Schools Act 1998. 
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these report substantial improvements in test scores due to the use of methods of ‘best practice’. 
In our analysis, we look at mechanisms in the case of academies and, as we will show, some of 
these overlap with the successful features of innovation in these in-district charters and school 
conversions/takeovers. 
Many of the US experimental and quasi-experimental studies are relatively small scale in 
that their treatment group is often a small sample of schools (or even a single school in the case 
of Angrist et al., 2010). Interestingly, they do find positive effects for lotteried in pupils. 
Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011) find that the lotteried in pupils experience significant 
improvements in their English language arts (ELA) scores and math scores at both middle and 
high schools, with effects being larger for the latter. Hoxby and Murarka (2009) also find that 
lotteried in pupils experience significant improvements in both their maths scores and reading 
scores between the third and eighth grade compared to the lotteried out pupils who remain in 
traditional public schools. Angrist et al. (2010) find that lotteried in students who attend KIPP 
Academy Lynn, a school that serves students in grades five through to eight, experience 
significant improvements in their maths scores and ELA scores. In a separate study, Dobbie and 
Fryer (2011) look at schools in Harlem in New York, with results being broadly similar results 
to those of Angrist et al. (2010). 
An issue with the experimental studies is that lotteries only occur in the schools that are 
oversubscribed. Given that successful schools are more likely to be oversubscribed, estimates 
that exploit the lottery process are likely to be upper bounds. As an alternative, some studies 
adopt non-experimental methods to appraise the charter school model. They tend to produce 
more mixed results. For example, the CREDO (2009) study uses propensity score matching 
10 
methods finding charter school performance to be no better (or worse) than neighbouring 
traditional public schools. 
One problem with non-experimental methods is how well they deal with selection bias 
compared to the lottery based estimates. An informative study that addresses this issue is by 
Hoxby and Murarka (2007). They estimate treatment effects for charter schools using both non-
experimental methods and lottery based estimates, finding that their non-experimental estimates 
replicate their lottery-based estimates. Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2011) compare experimental 
lottery estimates with observational estimates on a large sample of Massachusetts schools, 
reporting positive urban charter school effects in both cases. However, Dobbie and Fryer (2013) 
report that observational estimates from New York schools give lower effect sizes than lottery 
estimates from the same sample of schools suggesting that the use of matching and regression 
alone may lead to downward bias. 
On academies themselves, there remains very little rigorous research work. There are 
early studies of small numbers of converters by Machin and Wilson (2008) and evaluations by 
Price Waterhouse Coopers (PwC Report 2008), plus various National Audit Office reports.14
Machin and Wilson (2008) looked at differences in pupil performance in academy schools 
compared to the performance of a matched group of schools, finding modest, statistically 
insignificant, relative improvements. The PwC Report (2008) reported higher percentage point 
increases in the results of academies compared to the national average (which is not a good 
comparison since academies are well below average performers in their predecessor state). Both 
14
 See, for example, National Audit Office (2010, 2015) for reports on the Labour academies and the full Labour 
and Coalition academies programmes respectively. There is also some largely descriptive, non-causal school-level 
empirical work in the education field. See, for example, Gorard (2014) or West and Bailey (2013). 
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Machin and Wilson (2008) and PwC (2008) admitted their studies were in the early days of 
academy schools, so drawing any firm conclusions from their results is precipitous. 
A National Audit Office (2010) report on the Labour academies looked at their 
performance compared to a selected group of maintained schools for academies converting in 
the 2002/03 to 2007/08 school years and who had been open for at least two years. Their 
comparison group comprised schools with similar pupil intakes and performance to the pre-
treatment academies. They report a significant improvement in pupil performance in the 
academies compared to the comparison group, arguing the result to be driven by more 
advantaged pupils attending the academy post-conversion. 
In our analysis reported on below we separately study intake and performance for this 
very reason, because we observe changes in the ability composition of pupils in terms of their 
prior academic achievement entering schools after they become academies. Thus we implement 
a research design studying performance effects only for children who were enrolled in the 
converting schools before they became academies (in the terminology of Abdulkadiroglu et al. 
(2014), who study school takeovers in New Orleans, these are ‘grand-fathered’ pupils). Since 
the initial enrolment decision was made for the pre-conversion school, academy conversion 
should be exogenous to these students, and therefore the study of pupil performance effects can 
be set up as in terms of an intention to treat empirical exercise, from which we can obtain a 
causal estimate of a local average treatment effect. 
12 
3. Data and Research Designs
Data 
Our main source data source is the National Pupil Database (NPD).15 The NPD is centrally 
collected census data containing pupil and school characteristics combined with the annual 
National Curriculum key stage attainment data at the pupil level. The Pupil Level Annual 
Census data (PLASC) contains information on characteristics of all pupils in the English 
maintained sector. This has been collected three times per year (January, May and September) 
from the 2001/02 school year onwards (though pupils can be traced back to earlier years of the 
key stage attainment data via their unique id). For this paper, we only use the year-on-year 
January collection because this collection is the most available and consistent over time.16  
In England, compulsory education is organised around four key stages for years of 
schooling from ages 5 to 16. These are key stage 1 (in years 1 and 2) and key stage 2 (years 3 to 
6) in primary school; and key stage 3 (years 7 to 9) and key stage 4 (years 10 and 11) in
secondary school. In studying academy conversion impacts, our two outcomes of interest are 
pupil intake and pupil performance. To study intake for pupils enrolling in secondary school in 
year 7, the first year of secondary school, we look at the key stage test scores (KS2) that pupils 
take at the end of primary school (aged 10/11 at the end of year 6) before they make the 
transition to secondary school.  To study performance in year 11, the final year of compulsory 
secondary schooling, we look at the key stage 4 (KS4) examinations that pupils take at the end 
15
 The use of pupil-level data throughout and refined research design are the key innovations compared to the 
earlier version of this paper (Machin and Vernoit, 2011). Of course, use of pupil-level data (which the earlier 
version did not have full access to) makes the analysis more appropriate in that the right level of treatment is the 
effect of schools on the pupils that attend them compared to schools they would otherwise have attended. Put 
another way, changing pupil composition due to academy conversion because the demand for places alters 
compared to the predecessor school can render school-level estimates biased. 
16See the Data Appendix for a detailed description of the sample constructions we use. 
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of compulsory schooling (aged 15/16 at the end of year 11). These school leaving exams are 
known as GCSEs (standing for the General Certificate of Secondary Education). 
The impact of academy conversion needs to be analysed at the pupil-level. This is 
because the underlying composition of students attending schools may change over time (as we 
show, pupil intake does change post-conversion). To study intake, we match each pupil entering 
year 7 of a secondary school over the 2001/02 to 2008/09 academic years to their KS2 results 
over the 2000/01 to 2007/08 academic years. It is important to note that we allow for this intake 
change when identifying the causal effect of academy attendance on KS4 performance by 
focusing on pupils already enrolled in an academy pre-conversion thus avoiding endogeneity of 
the post-conversion enrolment decision. 
One further practical issue concerns the definition of schools that convert to academies. 
There are a small number of examples where more than one predecessor school combines to 
create one academy school. Where this occurs, we create one hypothetical pre-academy school 
(see the discussion in the Data Appendix). This adopts hypothetical characteristics that are a 
weighted-average of the characteristics of the merged schools. 
Modelling Approach 
A conversion event c is defined as occurring in the school year t that the academy school 
starts operating (i.e. event year E(t = c) is when it ‘opens for business’ and admits new pupils as 
an academy). We then use the academic year that the academy status is awarded (and the years 
after) as the base that we need to calculate the quasi-experimental before/after conversion effect 
on the pupil-level outcomes of interest. 
We have two outcomes of interest. The first is to study the impact of academy school 
conversion on the quality of pupil intake, which we measure in terms of ability composition by 
14 
the end of primary school standardised KS2 average points score17 of pupils who enrol into year
7, the first year of secondary school. The second outcome, and the main outcome of interest in 
the paper, is the KS4 performance of pupils, measured as the standardised best 8 exams points 
score of individual year 11 students. We also consider robustness of the findings to different 
measures (the precise measures used for KS2 and KS4 are described in detail in the Data 
Appendix, together with additional performance results for a range of different KS4 measures). 
Research Design – Quality of Pupil Intake 
We begin by comparing what happens to pupil intake (measured by KS2 test scores of 
year 7 enrollers) before and after conversion for pupils attending schools that do and do not 
convert in the sample period. In the following equation for pupil i enrolled in year 7 in school s 
in year t, the key parameter of interest is the differences-in-differences coefficient δ: 
J
KS2 α α δA *I(E t c) λ X uist s t ist 1j jist 1istj 1
= + + ≥ = + +∑
=
(1) 
In (1) A is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the secondary school attended in the entry year of 
secondary school is in the treatment group (i.e. will become or is an academy in the sample 
period) and equals 0 if the school is in the comparison group (schools that do not convert to an 
academy in the sample period, but convert after the sample period ends). Defining E as an event 
year, the dummy variable indicator I(E ≥ t = c) takes a value 1 if the pupil enrols in conversion 
year c or after and X denotes a set of control variables. Finally, αs denotes school fixed effects, 
αt denotes year effects and u1 is an error term. 
17
 This is calculated by totalling (for each pupil) their raw scores in English, Maths and Science. We then average 
across the three before standardising to have mean zero and standard deviation one. 
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The specification in (1) imposes an average post-conversion effect across all post-
conversion years. A more flexible specification estimates separate treatment effects for pre- and 
post-conversion years, in an event study setting, as: 
e=c+3 J
KS2 = α + α + δ A *I(E=e) + λ X + uist s t e ist 2j jist 2ist
e=c-4 j=1
∑ ∑ (2) 
We report event study estimates of four pre-conversion δ’s (from E = c-4 to c-1) and four 
conversion year and post-conversion δ’s (from E = c to c+3). 
We also allow for heterogeneous effects by recognising that academies with different 
forms of predecessor school gain different amounts of autonomy when they convert. We 
consider differences by 'autonomy distance' by allowing effects to vary with the type of 
predecessor school. To do so, we estimate separate versions of (2) for academy conversions 
from community schools and conversions from non-community schools.18 The presumption
underpinning this is that the autonomy distance is largest for conversions that take place from 
predecessor community schools (see the earlier discussion around Table 3). 
Research Design - Pupil Performance 
To study pupil performance effects we look at the Key Stage 4 (KS4) performance of 
year 11 students. There are important identification issues that need to be considered here that 
did not apply to the KS2 intake part of our study. Specifically, there are three important 
dimensions of our empirical strategy that enable us to identify a causal effect of academy 
conversion on pupil performance: 
i) We consider children whose parents made their decision to enrol their children in the academy
before it converted. This ensures that academy conversion was exogenous to enrolment in 
secondary school. 
18
 We limit the control group to community/non-community predecessor  schools only in the respective regressions. 
16 
ii) We limit the event study on pupil performance to a maximum of four years post conversion,
including the year of conversion itself. This is because children spend five years in secondary 
school. Thus children affected by conversion when enrolled in the predecessor school in their 
first year of secondary school, year 7, could have up to four post-conversion years of education 
in the academy (i.e. since their full enrolment in the school runs from E = c-1 up to E = c+3). 
Similarly children affected by conversion when enrolled in the predecessor school in year 8 
could have up to three conversion years (to E = c+2), and so on for children in years 9 and 10 in 
the predecessor school. Thus the length of treatment varies depending on when conversion took 
place. Table A1 of the Data Appendix shows the structure of this treatment in more detail. 
iii) Since the initial enrolment decision was made for the pre-conversion school, academy
conversion should be exogenous to these students, and can be set up as in terms of an intention 
to treat (ITT) empirical exercise, from which we can obtain a causal estimate of a local average 
treatment effect (LATE). The ITT group is all pupils enrolled in the predecessor school who 
pre-conversion are lined up to take their year 11 KS4 exams in the school (i.e. year 7 students 
enrolled 4 years prior to conversion, year 8 students enrolled 3 years prior etc). The approach is 
similar to that taken in Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014), who study school takeovers in New 
Orleans, referring to pupils who stay in a converting school as ‘grand-fathered’ pupils. 
As we are interested in the causal impact of academy conversion on KS4 results we can 
first operationalise our empirical analysis by means of the following value added equation: 
1 1
J
KS4 = α + α + θ A *I(E t = c) + π X + φ KS2 + vist s t ist 1j jist ist 1istj=1
≥ ∑ (3) 
In (3) estimates of the θ1 coefficient is analogous to the KS2 difference-in-difference set up 
above, but because we now restrict to pupils enrolled in the pre-conversion school there is a 
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subtle difference. This is that not all pupils who end up taking their KS4 exam at a school that 
becomes an academy (Aist = 1) were enrolled in the school pre-conversion. Conversely, not all 
students initially enrolled in a school that converted to an academy (ITTist = 1) remain in the 
school to take their KS4 exams. Thus, ordinary least squares estimates of θ1 from (3) will not 
reflect a causal estimate. 
Defining the variable indicating treatment by an academy conversion as 
Z  = A *I(E t = c)ist ist ≥  we account for selection into and out of treatment by using intention to 
treat status (ITTist) as an instrument for Zist, to estimate a LATE as follows: 
2 2
J
 = α + α + θ ITT *I(E t = c) + π X + φ KS2 + vist s t ist 2j jist ist 2istj=1
Z ≥ ∑ (4) 
3 3
J
KS4 = α + α + θ ITT *I(E t = c) + π X + φ KS2 + vist s t ist 3j jist ist 3istj=1
≥ ∑ (5) 
In the first stage in (4) the estimates of θ2 show the proportion of the ITT group that stay in the 
academy and take KS4 exams there. These are the ‘grandfathered’ pupils that remain in the 
school. Equation (5) is the reduced form regression of KS4 results on the instrument. The 
instrumental variable (IV) estimate is the ratio of the reduced form coefficient to the first stage 
coefficient, θ3 /θ2. 
Extending this IV setting to the event study framework we are able to estimate separate 
estimates for the four years from conversion onwards (E = c to c+3) using four instruments for 
whether a pupil is ITT for event year c, event year c+1 and so on.19 Further extending to
19
 Formally, an individual enrolled in a treatment school in event year c-i  and academic year group k is, for 
instance, intention to treat for c+1 if c-i + (11-k) is equal to c+1, where 11 is the academic year group in which KS4 
exams are sat. The binary instrument in equation (4) is equal to 1 only if any one of the four instruments used for 
the event study equals 1.  
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estimate separately for community and non-community predecessor schools enables us to 
consider the impacts of autonomy distance associated with the conversion. 
Comparison Schools 
In Table 4, we compare average pre-treatment characteristics of academy schools and 
other types of maintained English secondary schools. It confirms that academies have 
significantly different characteristics from the other school types. This is true of pupil 
characteristics (like the proportion eligible for free school meals, the proportion white and the 
proportion with special educational needs) and of pupil performance (like the headline school 
leaving age measure of the proportion getting 5 or more A*-C GCSEs and equivalents and the 
Key Stage 2 primary school points score). 
This is not at all surprising. The whole point of Labour’s academy programme was to 
improve poorly performing schools. Thus, a naive comparison between academy schools and all 
other state-maintained schools is likely to suffer from significant selection bias. A related 
problem is that schools that go on to become academies may have common unobservable 
characteristics (e.g. they have a type of school ethos that is more in line with the academy 
model). Finally there is scope for mean reversion, as academies were badly performing schools 
in their predecessor state. 
Looking in more detail within the group of academies it does, however, turn out that the 
schools that convert to academy status between 2002/03 and 2008/09 have very similar pre-
treatment characteristics to the schools that later become academies. A set of balancing tests is 
given in the final row of the Table. One cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 106 academies 
that convert in the sample period and the 114 future academies have the same sets of 
characteristics. This partially legitimises our use of pupils attending future converters as a 
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control group in the D-i-D setting. It is further legitimised in the empirical findings we describe 
below where there are no differential pre-conversion trends in the same school years, thus 
allaying any concerns of mean reversion. 
Thus the data structure we use is a balanced panel of schools for the school years 
2000/01 to 2008/09 with repeated cross-sections of enrolled year 7 (for intake) and year 11 (for 
performance) pupils. Time variation in the academy conversion programme means that we can 
set these up in the event study framework detailed above. Table A2 of the Data Appendix shows 
the sample sizes for the different cohorts of academy schools in the KS2 and KS4 analyses that 
we undertake. 
4. Empirical Results
Academies and Pupil Intake 
In Table 5, we report results showing the effects of academy school conversion on the quality of 
pupil intake. The Table reports estimates from five different empirical specifications. We begin 
with the raw differences-in-differences estimate in column (1). We add time-varying controls in 
column (2). In column (3), we estimate heterogeneous effects in the event study setting, and in 
columns (4) and (5) we look at event study estimates for pupils in community and non-
community predecessor schools respectively. 
The estimated coefficients in the Table show that academies, post-conversion, attract 
pupils with significantly higher KS2 test scores than those schools that convert after our sample 
ends. Column (1) shows that, on average, pupils enrolling in an academy at year 7 have a KS2 
mean points score that is 0.074 of a standard deviation (σ) higher than those attending schools 
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yet to attain academy status. The average intake effect falls to 0.058σ with the addition of the 
controls in column (2). 
The event study estimates in column (3) show there to be no pre-conversion differences 
in trends between pupils in the treatment and control schools.  They show a conversion year 
impact (E = c) of 0.010σ. This gradually rises year on year post conversion, becoming strongly 
significant in statistical terms, before reaching 0.082σ by event year c+3.  These results suggest 
that (on average) there was a change in the pupil intake of schools when they converted to 
academy status. On conversion, academies began admitting higher ability pupils. 
As shown in Figure 1, this positive impact grows over time, suggesting important 
compositional changes in the academies student body over time. Interestingly, the positive 
intake effects are only present for academies that convert from community predecessor schools 
(as shown in column (4)) where the (bigger) conversion year impact of 0.056σ is significant and 
rises to 0.200 σ by E = c+3. Figure 2 plots the event study estimates by predecessor type and the 
clear difference is evident. 
Academies and Pupil Performance 
Table 6 shows OLS, ITT and IV estimates of the impact of academy conversion on Key 
Stage 4 pupil performance for year 11 children. Columns (1) to (3) show estimates of the impact 
of academy conversion on end of secondary school KS4 pupil performance from specifications 
without control variables. Columns (4) to (6) show estimates from value added specifications 
that net out end of primary school KS2 pupil performance and include controls while columns 
(7) to (9) extend the (4) to (6) specifications to the event study setting. 
The first point to note is that the estimates are broadly similar regardless of estimation 
method.  The columns (1) to (3) specifications show that being in an academy school increases 
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pupil’s KS4 standardised test scores by a statistically significant 0.082σ to 0.095σ. Adding the 
prior achievement measure (KS2) and control variables in columns (4) to (6) reduces this a little 
to 0.073σ to 0.080σ, which remains significant. Thus pupil achievement is significantly higher 
on average, and so is value added for pupils attending schools that converted to an academy. 
The interpretation of the ITT estimate in column (5) of a significant 0.073σ improvement 
is that KS4 went up by 0.073σ more for children enrolled in a pre-conversion school as 
compared to children enrolled in control schools in the same school years. The IV estimate in 
column (6) corrects for the fact that not all ITT children sat their KS4 examinations in the 
school (in fact 93.2 percent did as the highly significant first stage at the bottom of the Table 
shows) and this rises to 0.079σ. This is the preferred baseline average impact estimate of 
academy conversion. 
Columns (7)-(9) of Table 6 show the event study D-i-D estimates. These show no 
discernible pre-treatment trends, but a significant positive, and rising over time, impact after 
conversion. In the IV estimates of column (9), conversion year test scores are 0.037σ higher 
(though statistically insignificant), and this rises to (a statistically significant) 0.184σ four years 
post-conversion. Figure 3 very clearly shows the significant upturn after treatment and the lack 
of pre-conversion differences. It also makes it clear that academy conversion raised pupil 
performance, according to the causal IV estimates. 
In Table 7 and Figure 4 we show separate IV estimates for pupils attending academies 
that converted from community and non-community schools respectively. Significant – and 
sizable – effects are seen for the former, whilst there is no improvement for the latter. These 
results reveal an important finding in terms of the overall interpretation of our results. They 
suggest that pupils attending schools experiencing the largest increase in autonomy via 
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conversion – those from predecessor community schools – were the only ones to experience 
performance improvements. The estimated effects are large, for example with a year of 
conversion effect in the IV estimates being 0.097σ that reaches 0.388σ by c+3. 
Conversions from community schools enabled a gain of responsibility for the majority of 
the curriculum of the school (except the core subjects: English, Maths, Science and IT); the 
structure and length of the school day; the school budget and all staffing decisions. In the next 
section of the paper we look at which of these underlying mechanisms may have been behind 
the observed performance improvements. Prior to that, however, we consider some empirical 
extensions and study the robustness of the key findings. 
Extensions and Robustness 
Recall that the treatment effect we are estimating is time-varying because academy 
conversions occur in different school years 2002/03 through 2008/09 . Thus one extension we 
have considered is to estimate the most detailed KS4 models separately by cohort. Figure 5 plots 
IV estimates from the models separately by cohort.20 It is very clear that a null hypothesis of the
same average effects across cohorts is not rejected by the data. The gradually rising positive 
performance effects are seen across the four cohorts of conversions shown in the Figure. 
The event study estimates uncover a significant improvement in performance that grows 
with more years post-conversion. This is not quite the same, though is strongly connected, to the 
years of exposure to academy treatment that children receive. The reason why is that a small 
number of pupils do not sit their KS4 exams in an academy school and are not intention to treat, 
20
 It shows the equivalent to the Table 6 column (3) specification separately estimated for four year cohorts of 
conversions: these comprise the 10 conversions in school years 2002/03 and 20030/4 (3 from 2002/03 and 7 from 
2003/04), the 12 conversions from school years 20040/5 and 2005/06 (2 from 2004/05 and 10 from 2005/06), the 
45 conversions from 2006/07 and 2007/08 (15 from 2006/07 and 30 from 2007/08) and the 39 conversions from 
school year 2008/09. In each case they are compared to the control group of 114 schools that convert after the study 
sample period ends. 
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but are nevertheless exposed to treatment (i.e. they may enter post-conversion and leave prior to 
examinations). We have therefore reformulated the estimated models in terms of years of 
exposure to being taught in an academy. This involves defining the ITT variable and the 
treatment variable as years of exposure. Table 8 shows the results both for continuous and for 
dummy variable ITT and treatment years of exposure variables. It is evident that more years of 
exposure produces a bigger impact on pupil performance, and one that is of sizable magnitude 
for four years of exposure at 0.323σ in the academy conversions from predecessor community 
schools. 
Next we consider a falsification test. This is a test of whether the estimated θ coefficients 
reflect pre-existing differences in the outcomes of interest for our treatment group compared to 
our control group. To do the falsification exercise, we altered the year in which each cohort of 
academy school became an academy to that of an earlier time period. We then re-estimated our 
models calculating the θ coefficients based on a ‘fake’ year (four years before) where we 
pretended schools converted to academies. If the θ coefficients in this falsification exercise give 
similar results to that of our original specification, then we would worry that the results of our 
original specifications reflect pre-existing differences in the outcomes of interest. To avoid any 
contamination when pupils attend schools that actually have converted, as oppose to attending 
during the ‘fake’ conversion, it is necessary for there to be no overlap, at the school level, 
between  fake post-academy years and  actual post-academy years. This means that we have to 
shorten the post-treatment fake periods for the first three academy cohorts. Thus the sample size 
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drops. We also lose 4 schools who do not have GCSE sittings for some of the earlier 1997/98-
2000/01 period.21
The falsification exercise was conducted over the seven year period between the 1997/98 
and 2004/05 academic years. Column (1) of Table 8 shows the results for all conversions, and 
column (2) just for conversions from community schools. In both cases the estimated θ 
coefficients for the academy conversion are always close to zero and statistically insignificant. 
This fake policy experiment does seem to rule out that our results are driven by pre-existing 
unobservables. However, as already noted, it was carried out on a slightly different sample and 
so in columns (3) and (4) of Tables 7, we report the original specifications for the same sample 
of schools. They are very similar to the main KS4 results of the paper.22 The same is true when
the value added specification adding in KS2 (which we are unable to do for the fake policy) is 
considered in columns (5) and (6). 
We have also looked at other measures of KS4 performance. These are shown in 
Appendix Tables A2-A4. All models are comparable with those in Tables 6 and 7. If, rather than 
using the total points score, we consider the proportion getting 5 A*-C GCSEs (and their 
equivalents) and or the proportion getting 5 A*-C GCSEs (and their equivalents) but including 
GCSEs in Maths and English, we see a very similar pattern of results. It is evident that, with 
some subtleties, the same overall pattern of results is clear. Estimates that look separately at 
GCSEs and equivalents are somewhat noisy although marked effects for the equivalent 
qualifications and GCSEs are found in community converters. 
21
 This is because some schools open post 1992/93 and so their first GSCE cohorts are post 1997/98 – sample sizes 
for the fake policy experiment are shown in Appendix Table A5. 
22
 Pre-2002 observations (and hence our fake policy) have limited data on pupil characteristics. Therefore when we 
re-estimate our original model on the new sample of schools we omit those covariates that are missing pre-2002. 
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Finally, we considered a different measure of whether academisation under the Labour 
programme resulted in improved school performance by looking at Ofsted inspections of 
schools before and after conversion, again relative to control schools.23 Table 9 shows transition
matrices for treatment and control schools in the 2000s. These transitions constitutes movements 
in inspection rankings (of outstanding, good, satisfactory or inadequate) before and after 
academy conversion for academies in the early and late 2000s and the same for comparison 
schools. Not all schools were inspected twice in this period so we are forced to analyse a sub-set 
of schools. 
The descriptive statistics in Table 9 show that academies were, on average, more likely 
to move up the rankings before and after conversion as compared to comparison schools. 
Ordered probit estimates reported in Table 10 confirm this and show a statistically significant 
improvement in inspection rankings of academies. We take this as complementary and 
corroborative evidence in line with the KS4 performance gains we have already reported. 
5. Mechanisms
The above results uncovered evidenced of significant performance improvements for pupils 
treated by academy conversion. They also showed these improvements to be more pronounced 
for those attending schools that gained the greatest autonomy. We now address the question - 
what use of academy freedoms can account for these findings? 
To begin the discussion of mechanisms, we first draw on the Department for Education’s 
(2014) survey of academy schools ‘Do Academies Make Use of Their Autonomy?’. This survey 
23
 Ofsted is the Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills which is a government department 
of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Schools in England which undertakes inspections of schools as part of the 
strongly enforced school accountability system that operates in England. 
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collected information on a wide array of changes that may have occurred following 
conversion.24  These are summarised in Table 11 for 23 of the Labour academies we analyse in
this paper, and for 148 academies (including the 23) overall. 
Table 11 ranks the responses in order of the percent making the particular change 
considered in the survey. The three most prominent changes, amongst the 23 converters in our 
sample, were ‘changed school leadership’, ‘procured services that were previously provided by 
the local authority’ and ‘changed the curriculum you offer’. Over 75 percent of the schools said 
they made these changes pursuant to gaining the new academy freedoms. This ranking is 
broadly consistent with that of the 148 sponsored academies overall. 
When asked what the most important change was, two answers dominate -  ‘changed 
school leadership’ (at 56 percent) and ‘changed the curriculum you offer’ (at 26 percent). 
Furthermore, both of these were reported to be linked to improved outcomes (in 73 and 77 
percent of cases respectively). Other changes that were notably linked to improved outcomes 
were ‘Increased the length of the school day’ (63 percent) and ‘Collaborated with other schools 
in more formalised partnerships’ (45 percent). 
Looking at differences between treatment and control schools in the D-i-D event study 
offers further evidence. We can look at three of the important factors identified in Table 11: 
whether a new headteacher is taken on upon conversion; whether more pupils are enrolled; and 
whether more teachers are taken on. This is facilitated by the availability of school level data 
over time on each of these. 
24
 In May 2013 the Department for Education sent a questionnaire to all 2919 open academies. Of the 720 
respondents, 148 were sponsored academies, with 74 of these being secondary schools. Of the 74, 23 converted pre-
May 2010 and thus were academies at some point in our sample period. 
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Table 12 reports results for headteacher change. Event study estimates show evidence of 
considerable headteacher turnover when a school converts, and that this is concentrated in the 
conversion year. In treatment schools, 59 percent more headteacher turnover occurred in the 
year of conversion c as compared to the control schools. This seems to be a one off change that 
occurs as the subsequent year treatment effects from c+1 to c+3 are all insignificantly different 
from zero. The rate of headteacher turnover is a little higher 62 percent in conversions from 
predecessor community schools, but is also high at 51 percent in predecessor non-community 
schools, showing that changing headteacher is a general and widespread feature of academy 
conversions. 
Thus a strong feature of academy conversions is to replace the headteacher. There is a 
more modest turnaround of the rank and file teaching staff, and much of this is due to a need to 
take on more teachers as more pupils enrol in academies post conversion. This is shown from 
the results reported in Table 13.  The Table shows event study D-i-D estimates of the effect of 
academy conversion on  the number of teachers, number of pupils and the teacher-pupil ratio. 
Looking at columns (1)-(3) shows that the number of teachers rose gradually for event study 
years c+1 through c+3, although there was no significant effect in the year of conversion. This is 
because, as shown in columns (4)-(6), more pupils were enrolled as the academies were up and 
running, again with an insignificant change in the year of conversion, but with increases in pupil 
numbers by c+3.  Finally, columns (7)-(9) show that the number of teachers increasing was 
largely due to increased pupil enrolments (except in the conversion year where the teacher-pupil 
ratio did rise, especially in conversions from predecessor community schools because of a blip 
down in pupil enrolments that year). Overall, however, the Table shows less clear evidence of 
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teacher turnover as compared to the very significant evidence of headteacher turnover shown in 
Table 12. 
6. Conclusions
This paper focusses on what has become a high profile case of education policy – the 
introduction of academy schools into the English secondary school sector. We consider the 
impact of academy school conversion on pupil intake and performance. Academy conversion is 
seen to generate a significant improvement in the quality of pupil intake and significant 
improvements in pupil performance for those who attended schools treated by academy 
conversion. There is evidence of heterogeneity in the estimated performance effects as they 
occur only for schools experiencing the largest increase in their school autonomy relative to 
their predecessor state. 
For children attending academies that converted from a community school we find that 
transformation to an academy raised their educational outcomes by 0.14σ on average, and by 
more for children receiving more years of treatment (rising to around 0.39 of a standard 
deviation three years post-conversion). These findings complement existing work from different 
settings like that on US charter schools (both newly set up and more closely to takeovers of 
public schools) on whether different school types can affect pupil performance. 
In undertaking this empirical study, we offer new evidence about what happens when 
poorly performing disadvantaged schools convert to a new type of state school characterised by 
greater autonomy and flexible governance. Possible mechanisms underpinning the estimated 
pupil performance effects are investigated, both by studying survey evidence and by generating 
direct evidence from our samples of pupils and schools. Evidence suggests that factors 
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underpinning the improvements in pupil performance following conversion to academies are 
headteacher replacement/changes in management structure and curriculum change. 
Before finishing, it is appropriate to place these findings into their policy context, 
especially given the very big and rapid education reforms that have occurred recently in 
England. We study the sponsored academies set up under the Labour government’s programme, 
which set up 133 academies in the school years we study and which had 203 up and running in 
May 2010 when a new coalition government was voted in. Since then, the academies 
programme has been massively expanded and taken on a new direction, with the number of 
conversions skyrocketing and with new convertors not only being in the secondary sector, but 
also covering primary schools, and even reaching outside the state sector to some private 
schools. Moreover, the new coalition academies need not have a sponsor when they are 
converted. Mass academisation seems to be the order of the day in English education. 
 It is noteworthy that a key feature distinguishing these new coalition academies is that, 
on average, they are not characterised by poor performance and disadvantage in their 
predecessor state like the sponsored academies introduced and approved under the previous 
Labour government which we analyse in this paper.25 The way some of them are run is also
different with, for example, some of the post May 2010 academies being run as chains of 
schools by major sponsors. It will be an important future research challenge to determine 
whether or not these new convertor and chain run academies are able to deliver the kinds of 
performance improvements for students enrolling in them that the Labour programme we study 
here seemed to do. 
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Figure 1: Event Study Estimates of Pupil Intake and Academy Conversion, 
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 Notes: From columns (3) specification of Table 5. 
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Figure 2: Event Study Estimates of Pupil Intake and Academy Conversion, 
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KS2 of Pupils Enrolled in Year 7 by Predecessor Type
Pupil Intake and Academy Conversion
 Notes: From columns (4) and (5) specifications of Table 5. 
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 Figure 3: Event Study Instrumental Variable Estimates of Pupil Performance and Academy Conversion, 
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Pupil Performance and Academy Conversion, IV Estimates
Notes: From column (9) specification of Table 6. 
36 
Figure 4: Event Study Instrumental Variable Estimates of Pupil Performance and Academy Conversion, 
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Notes: From columns (2) and (4) specifications of Table 7. 
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Figure 5: Event Study Instrumental Variable Estimates of Pupil Performance and Academy Conversion, 
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Notes: From cohort specific estimates of column  (9) specification of Table 6. 
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Registered independent schoola     
Academyb     
City technology collegec     
Voluntary-aidedd     
Foundatione     
Voluntary-controlledf     




a - Registered independent schools are independent of the local authority (LA), and are fee-charging. 
b - Academy schools (prior to 2010/11):  all ability independent specialist schools, which do not charge fees, and are not maintained by the 
local authority; established by sponsors from business, faith, HE institutions or voluntary groups, working in partnership with central 
government. Sponsors and the DfE provide the capital costs for the Academy. Running costs are met by the DfE in accordance with the 
number of pupils, at a similar level to that provided by local authorities for maintained schools serving similar catchment areas.  
c - City Technology Colleges:  all ability independent schools, which do not charge fees, and are not maintained by the local education 
authority. Their curriculum has a particular focus on science and technology education (see West and Bailey, 2013). They were established by 
sponsors from business, faith or voluntary groups. Sponsors and the DfE provided the capital costs for the CTC. Running costs are met by the 
DfE in accordance with the number of pupils, at a similar level to that provided by local authorities for maintained schools serving similar 
catchment areas. 
d – Voluntary-aided schools are maintained by the local authority. The foundation (generally religious) appoints most of the governing body. 
The governing body is responsible for admissions and employing the school staff.  Land at voluntary-aided schools is usually owned by 
trustees, although the local authority often owns any playing field land (DfE, 2012). 
e - Foundation (formerly grant-maintained) schools are maintained by the local authority.  The governing body is responsible for admissions, 
employing the school staff, and either the foundation or the governing body owns the school’s land and buildings (DfE, 2013). 
f – Voluntary-controlled schools are maintained by the local authority. These are mostly religious schools where the local authority continues 
to be the admission authority. Land at voluntary-controlled schools is usually owned by trustees, although the local authority often owns any 
playing field land (DfE, 2013). 
g - Community schools are maintained by the local authority. The local authority is responsible for admissions, employing the school staff, and 
it also owns the school’s land and buildings. 
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Table 2 - Number (Percent) of Secondary Schools in England, 2001/02 and 2008/09 
Number (Percent) of Secondary Schools by Type 
2001/02 2008/09 
Academy 0 (0.0) 133 (4.0) 
City technology college 14 (0.4) 3 (0.1) 
Voluntary aided 549 (15.8) 537 (16.0) 
Foundation 501 (14.4) 560 (16.7) 
Voluntary controlled 129 (3.7) 111 (3.3) 
Community 2278 (65.6) 2017 (59.9) 
Total 3471 3361 
Notes: Source – School Census. Includes middle schools. Excludes special schools. This is partially available from Tables 2.1 and 2.2 in 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120504203418/http://education.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/VOL/v000359/dfes_schools_final.pdf 
and Table 2a in  http://www.education.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/SFR/s000925/sfr09-2010.pdf. 
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Table 3: The Nature of Academy Conversions 
All Schools 
 Pre-Academy School Type 








All academies 244 12 5 12 18 34 2 161 
Become academies, 
up to 2008/09 
133 12 5 12 10 15 1 78 
Future academies, 
after 2008/09 
111 0 0 0 8 19 1 83 
All Schools With Full Data (Pre- and Post-Academy Conversion) 
 Pre-Academy School Type 








All academies 220 0 0 12 15 33 2 158 
Become academies, 
up to 2008/09 
106 0 0 12 10 15 1 68 
Future academies, 
after 2008/09 
114 0 0 0 5 18 1 90 
 Notes:  Source for upper panel, same as Table 2.  Source for lower panel, own calculations from Edubase, School Performance Tables and Annual Schools Census. 
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Table 4: Pre-Conversion Characteristics and Tests of Balancing 
Key stage 2 
points score 
(mean) 
Key stage 4 
points score 
(mean) 
Proportion getting 5 


















A. All Schools 
City technology college 74.786 58.983 0.934 0.483 0.945 0.077 0.108 2 
Voluntary aided 66.687 44.079 0.590 0.505 0.791 0.149 0.166 504 
Foundation 65.453 43.766 0.580 0.524 0.835 0.113 0.184 473 
Voluntary controlled 66.676 43.999 0.579 0.510 0.885 0.104 0.169 97 
Community 61.997 38.684 0.464 0.505 0.833 0.186 0.219  1975 
Academies (Pre-conversion) 57.201 32.140 0.346 0.530 0.753 0.323 0.277 106 
B. Academy Schools 
Current academies 
(treatment group) 
57.201 32.140 0.346 0.530 0.753 0.323 0.277 106 
Future academies 
(control group) 
56.589 31.344 0.313 0.517 0.813 0.288 0.263 114 
Difference 0.612 (0.920) 0.796 (1.011) 0.033 (0.025) 0.013 (0.015) -0.060 (0.035) 0.035 0.022) 0.014 (0.020) 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at school level reported in parentheses.  Both panels refer to characteristics in the 2001/02 school year. The top panel is maintained schools in the 
UK, which do not convert to academies prior to, or in, the academic year 2008/09. Minor discrepancies between this Table and Table 2 are due to the removal of approximately 
300 middle schools. All variables with the exception of KS4 points score and the proportion achieving five or more A*-Cs refers to characteristics of the incoming 2001/02 cohort 
i.e. incoming pupils in the school year 2001/02, before any academies had opened.  
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Table 5: Pupil Intake, Key Stage 2, Enrolled in Year 7, 2000/01 to 2008/09 
Key Stage 2 (Standardised) 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Academy x Post-Conversion (E = c to c+3) 0.074 (0.023) 0.058 (0.021) 
Academy x (E = c-4) -0.013 (0.018) -0.008 (0.024) -0.021 (0.026) 
Academy x (E = c-3) -0.029 (0.022) -0.011 (0.029) -0.047 (0.032) 
Academy x (E = c-2) -0.022  (0.020) 0.005 (0.023) -0.049 (0.036) 
Academy x (E = c-1) -0.023 (0.023) -0.008 (0.030) -0.033 (0.038) 
Academy x (E = c) 0.010 (0.027) 0.056 (0.031) -0.045 (0.047) 
Academy x (E = c+1) 0.060 (0.033) 0.122 (0.041) -0.010 (0.053) 
Academy x (E = c+2) 0.106 (0.044) 0.193 (0.046) -0.046 (0.076) 
Academy x (E = c+3) 0.082 (0.052) 0.200 (0.052) -0.082 (0.083) 
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.087 0.332 0.332 0.310 0.376 
Sample Size 353077 353077 353077 250222 102855 
Number of Treatment and Control Schools 220 220 220 158 62 
Notes: E denotes event year and c is the year of conversion. Robust standard errors (clustered at the school level) are reported in parentheses. Control variables are dummies for 
whether the pupil is male, the pupil’s ethnicity group, whether they are eligible for free school meals and whether they have special educational needs. 
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Table 6: Pupil Performance, Key Stage 4, Year 11, 2000/01 to 2008/09 
Key Stage 4 Points Score (Standardised) 
OLS ITT IV OLS ITT IV OLS ITT IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Academy x Post-Conversion (E = c to c+3) 0.095 (0.026) 0.082 (0.024) 0.088 (0.026) 0.080 (0.027) 0.073 (0.025) 0.079 (0.027) 
Academy x (E = c-4) -0.016 (0.018) -0.025 (0.018) -0.015 (0.019) 
Academy x (E = c-3) 0.002 (0.024) -0.010 (0.022) 0.004 (0.024) 
Academy x (E = c-2) 0.023 (0.028) 0.009 (0.026) 0.025 (0.028) 
Academy x (E = c-1) 0.023 (0.034) 0.008 (0.032) 0.025 (0.035) 
Academy x (E = c) 0.029 (0.038) 0.022 (0.034) 0.037 (0.039) 
Academy x (E = c+1) 0.146 (0.050) 0.128 (0.043) 0.155 (0.051) 
Academy x (E = c+2) 0.219 (0.071) 0.172 (0.061) 0.207 (0.074) 
Academy x (E = c+3) 0.192 (0.080) 0.148 (0.074) 0.184 (0.090) 
KS2 Standardised Test Score 0.523 (0.005) 0.523 (0.005) 0.523 (0.005) 0.523 (0.005) 0.523 (0.005) 0.523 (0.005) 
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.482 0.482 0.482 0.482 0.482 0.482 
Sample Size 362424 362424 362424 362424 362424 362424 362424 362424 362424 
Number of Treatment and Control Schools 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
First Stage Coefficient on ITT 0.932 (0.007) 0.932 (0.007) 
First Stage F-Test 8115 3973 
First Stage Coefficient on ITT x (E = c) 0.952 (0.004) 
First Stage F-Test 33071 
First Stage Coefficient on ITT x (E = c+1) 0.905 (0.007) 
First Stage F-Test 4034 
First Stage Coefficient on ITT x (E = c+2) 0.885 (0.011) 
First Stage F-Test 1733 
First Stage Coefficient on ITT x (E = c+3) 0.875 (0.015) 
First Stage F-Test 619 
 
 
Notes: E denotes event year and c is the year of conversion. Robust standard errors (clustered at the school level) are reported in parentheses. Control variables included are the same as from the Table 5 
regressions, although in specifications including KS2 test scores we now additionally include a separate intercept for pupils for whom KS2 data is unavailable. For children who move out of treatment or 
control schools to take their KS4, school fixed effects (1714) for the school they move to are also included. 
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Table 7: Pupil Performance, Key Stage 4, Year 11, 2000/01 to 2008/09, by Predecessor School Type 
Key Stage 4 Points Score (Standardised) 
Pupils in Community Predecessor School Pupils in Non-Community Predecessor School 
IV IV IV IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Academy x Post-Conversion (E = c to c+3) 0.143 (0.032) 0.017 (0.043) 
Academy x (E = c-4) -0.017 (0.022) -0.005 (0.033) 
Academy x (E = c-3) 0.038 (0.027) -0.035 (0.045) 
Academy x (E = c-2) 0.063 (0.033) -0.013 (0.051) 
Academy x (E = c-1) 0.072 (0.040) -0.009 (0.065) 
Academy x (E = c) 0.097 (0.046) -0.014 (0.073) 
Academy x (E = c+1) 0.280 (0.062) 0.037 (0.084) 
Academy x (E = c+2) 0.349 (0.078) 0.031 (0.124) 
Academy x (E = c+3) 0.388 (0.080) -0.012 (0.139) 
KS2 Standardised Test Score 0.533 (0.006) 0.533 (0.006) 0.495 (0.009) 0.495 (0.009) 
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.454 0.455 0.521 0.521 
Sample Size 258409 258409 104015 104015 
Number of Treatment and Control Schools 158 158 62 62 
First Stage Coefficient on ITT 0.926 (0.009) 0.937 (0.012) 
First Stage F-Test 2342 7648 
First Stage Coefficient on ITT x (E = c) 0.947 (0.005) 0.960(0.005) 
First Stage F-Test 21044 24646 
First Stage Coefficient on ITT x (E = c+1) 0.893 (0.010) 0.918 (0.010) 
First Stage F-Test 2099 11290 
First Stage Coefficient on ITT x (E = c+2) 0.879 (0.014) 0.893 (0.016) 
First Stage F-Test 883 3235 
First Stage Coefficient on ITT x (E = c+3) 0.863 (0.019) 0.885 (0.022) 
First Stage F-Test 333 1137 
 Notes: As for Table 6. 
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Table 8: Pupil Performance, Key Stage 4, Year 11, 2000/01 to 2008/09, Years of Exposure 
Key Stage 4 Points Score (Standardised) 
Pupils in All Schools Pupils in Community 
Predecessor School 
Pupils in Non-Community 
Predecessor School 
IV IV IV IV IV IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total Years of Exposure to Academy 0.054 (0.017) 0.095 (0.016) 0.012 (0.026) 
One Year of Exposure to Academy 0.025 (0.024) 0.061 (0.031) -0.001 (0.040) 
Two Years of Exposure to Academy 0.141 (0.041) 0.237 (0.050) 0.050 (0.057) 
Three Year of Exposure to Academy 0.189 (0.064) 0.297 (0.067) 0.048 (0.101) 
Four Years of Exposure to Academy 0.161 (0.079) 0.323 (0.064) 0.005 (0.115) 
KS2 Standardised Test Score 0.523 (0.005) 0.523 (0.005) 0.533 (0.006) 0.533 (0.006) 0.495 (0.009) 0.495 (0.009) 
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.481 0.481 0.454 0.454 0.521 0.523 
Sample Size 363116 363116 258989 258989 104127 104127 
Number of Treatment and Control Schools 220 220 158 158 62 62 
First Stage Coefficient on ITT Years of Exposure 0.880(0.013) 0.869 (0.017) 0.894 (0.021) 
First Stage F-Test 1070 813 1620 
First Stage Coefficient on ITT x One Year of Exposure 0.951 (0.004) 0.946 (0.005) 0.961 (0.005) 
First Stage F-Test 9443 5445 6994 
First Stage Coefficient on ITT x Two Years of Exposure 0.907 (0.008) 0.895 (0.010) 0.924 (0.011) 
First Stage F-Test 861 482 1238 
First Stage Coefficient on ITT x Three Years of Exposure 0.900 (0.011) 0.893 (0.015) 0.914 (0.015) 
First Stage F-Test 452 323 451 
First Stage Coefficient on ITT x Four Years of Exposure 0.913 (0.014) 0.905 (0.019) 0.924 (0.019) 
First Stage F-Test 322 235 297 
Notes: As for Table 6. The sample size differences compared to Tables 6 and 7 are because a small number of pupils do not sit their KS4 exams in an academy school and are not intention 
to treat but are nevertheless exposed to treatment i.e. they may enter post-conversion and leave prior to examinations. Restricting the sample to pupils appearing in both the exposure and 
event study samples gives us 362412 observations. Running the specifications in Tables 6 and 7 on this sample makes no difference to the reported results.  
46 
Table 9: Fake Policy (t-4) For Pupil Performance, Key Stage 4, Year 11
Key Stage 4 Points Score 
Fake Policy, 1997/98 to 2004/05 . Original Specifications For Pupils in Fake Policy Sample of Schools, 2000/01 to 2008/09 





Pupils in All 
Schools 
Pupils in Community 
Predecessor School 
Pupils in All 
Schools 
Pupils in Community 
Predecessor School 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Academy x (E = c-8) -0.022 (0.019) -0.023 (0.026) Academy x (E = c-4) -0.012 (0.018) -0.013 (0.022) -0.014 (0.018) -0.019 (0.022) 
Academy x (E = c-7) -0.030 (0.022) -0.041 (0.027) Academy x (E = c-3) 0.006 (0.025) 0.036 (0.027) 0.006 (0.024) 0.036 (0.027) 
Academy x (E = c-6) -0.024 (0.026) -0.033 (0.030) Academy x (E = c-2) 0.030 (0.028) 0.060 (0.032) 0.022 (0.028) 0.054 (0.033) 
Academy x (E = c-5) -0.011 (0.029) -0.012 (0.033) Academy x (E = c-1) 0.013 (0.035) 0.052 (0.038) 0.018 (0.035) 0.058 (0.040) 
Academy x (E = c-4) -0.021 (0.032) -0.029 (0.035) Academy x (E = c) 0.042 (0.038) 0.092 (0.043) 0.027 (0.038) 0.078 (0.045) 
Academy x (E = c-3) 0.000 (0.037) 0.005 (0.042) Academy x (E = c+1) 0.162(0.050) 0.260 (0.059) 0.145 (0.051) 0.250 (0.063) 
Academy x (E = c-2) 0.014 (0.044) 0.001 (0.051) Academy x (E = c+2) 0.240 (0.063) 0.316 (0.068) 0.227 (0.072) 0.335 (0.078) 
Academy x (E = c-1) 0.035 (0.053) -0.035 (0.050) Academy x (E = c+3) 0.293 (0.073) 0.415 (0.081) 0.225 (0.073) 0.367 (0.071) 
P-value for test of joint significance 
of Fake Policy (c-8 to c-1) 
0.663 0.707 
KS2 Standardised Test Score 0.524 (0.005) 0.534 (0.006) 
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Limited Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Full Control Variables No No No No Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.140 0.079 0.130 0.072 0.480 0.456 
Sample Size 301675 218171 357411 256534 357411 256534 
Number of Treatment and Control 
Schools 
216 156 216 156 216 156 
 
 
Notes: E denotes event year and c is the year of conversion. Robust standard errors (clustered at the school level) are reported in parentheses. Compared to OLS estimates in Tables 6 and 7, control 
variables for specifications (1) and (2) are limited for the Fake Policy time period and comprise solely of gender. 
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Table 10: Ofsted Inspection Ratings Transition Matrices, Inspections in the 2000s 
Current Academies 
Post-Conversion (Second Inspection) 
Outstanding Good Satisfactory Inadequate Total 
Before Conversion 
(First Inspection) 
Outstanding 5 2 0 1 8 
Good 2 2 4 3 11 
Satisfactory 1 3 8 2 14 
Inadequate 2 6 5 0 13 
Total 10 13 17 6 46 
Percent Improvement in Ranking = 41 
Percent No Change in Ranking = 33 
Percent Reduction in Ranking = 26 
Future Academies 
Post-Conversion (Second Inspection) 
Outstanding Good Satisfactory Inadequate Total 
Before Conversion 
(First Inspection) 
Outstanding 2 1 1 0 4 
Good 0 5 27 6 38 
Satisfactory 1 9 28 6 44 
Inadequate 1 6 10 2 19 
Total 4 21 66 14 105 
Percent Improvement in Ranking = 26 
Percent No Change in Ranking = 35 
Percent Reduction in Ranking = 39 
 Notes: For schools with two OfSted inspections in the 2000s, 46 in upper panel, 105 in lower panel. 
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Table 11: Ordered Probit Estimates of Change in Ofsted Ranking, School Level 
Pr[Change in OfSted Ranking] 
(1) (2) 
Current Academies (Treatment Group) 0.661 (0.219) 0.724 (0.221) 
Control Variables No Yes 
Sample Size (Number of Treatment and Control Schools) 151 151 
Marginal Effects: 
Pr[Change = 2||Treatment=1] – Pr[Change=2|Treatment=0] 0.239 (0.081) 0.261 (0.081) 
Pr[Change = 1||Treatment=1] – Pr[Change=1|Treatment=0] -0.012 (0.023) -0.017 (0.025) 
Pr[Change = 0||Treatment=1] – Pr[Change=0|Treatment=0] -0.226 (0.069) -0.244 (0.069) 
Notes: The dependent variable is coded as 0 for a reduction in Ofsted rating, 1 for no change and 2 for an improvement. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The control 
variables included in specification (2) are proportion male, proportion white, proportion of pupils eligible for free school meals and the proportion of pupils with special 
educational needs al measured in the year of first inspection.  Year of inspection dummies are also included. 
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Table 12: Department of Education Survey of Changes After Academy Conversion, 
23 Labour Academies and 148 Sponsored Academies 
23 Labour Academies 
148 Sponsored Academies  
Including the 23 Labour Academies 
Percent Making Change Percent Say Most 
Important Change 
Percent Making Change Say 
Linked to Improved Attainment 
Changed school leadership 87 72 56 73 
Procured services that were previously provided by the 
LA 78 83 5 17 
Changed the curriculum you offer 74 61 26 77 
Changed the performance management system for 
teachers 74 70 3 39 
Collaborated with other schools in more formalised 
partnerships 70 68 8 45 
Introduced savings in back-office functions 70 55 0 12 
Added non-teaching positions 70 50 3 31 
Reconstituted your governing body 65 76 0 26 
Changed your pattern of capital expenditure 65 54 1 19 
Increased the number of pupils on roll 61 41 0 12 
Hired teachers without qualified teacher status (QTS) 48 24 0 14 
Introduced or increased revenue-generating activities 48 34 0 8 
Changed your admission criteria 43 20 0 7 
Increased the length of the school day 39 18 0 63 
Changed staff pay structures 30 24 0 9 
Sought to attract pupils from a different geographical area 13 12 0 11 
Changed the length of school terms 9 6 0 22 
Reduced the number of pupils on roll 4 3 0 0 
Notes: Taken from Department for Education (2014). 
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Table 13: Change in Headteacher Before and After Academy Conversion 
Pr[Change in Headteacher] 






(1) (2) (3) 
Academy x (E = c-4) -0.052 (0.052) -0.033 (0.069) -0.129 (0.085) 
Academy x (E = c-3) -0.037 (0.056) -0.015 (0.066) -0.101 (0.101) 
Academy x (E = c-2) 0.006 (0.056) 0.079 (0.070) -0.167 (0.093) 
Academy x (E = c-1) 0.014 (0.050) 0.040 (0.057) -0.072 (0.101) 
Academy x (E = c) 0.594 (0.058) 0.617 (0.072) 0.508 (0.101) 
Academy x (E = c+1) -0.033 (0.060) -0.016 (0.072) -0.100 (0.106) 
Academy x (E = c+2) 0.057 (0.084) 0.116 (0.106) -0.119 (0.144) 
Academy x (E = c+3) 0.025 (0.108) 0.072 (0.147) -0.084 (0.166) 
P-value for test of joint significance (E =c-4 to c-1) 0.530 0.562 0.437 
P-value for test of joint significance (E = c to c+3) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.317 0.315 0.353 
Sample Size 1735 1244 491 
Number of Treatment and Control Schools 220 158 62 
Notes: E denotes event year and c is the year of conversion. Robust standard errors (clustered at the school level) are reported 
in parentheses. Control variable are percentage of year 7 intake male, white-origin, free school meal status and special 
educational needs status. A pooled Academy x Post-Conversion (E = c to c+3) estimate and associated standard error (in 
parentheses) comparable to (1) for all schools is 0.345 (0.042).  
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Table 14: Numbers of Teachers and Pupils Before and After Academy Conversion 
Log(Number of Teachers) Log(Number of Pupils) Log(Teachers Per Pupil) 





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Academy x (E = c-4) 0.005 (0.009) 0.008 (0.011) 0.003 (0.018) -0.003 (0.008) -0.002 (0.009) -0.003 (0.018) 0.007 (0.008) 0.010 (0.010) 0.006 (0.014) 
Academy x (E = c-3) -0.002 (0.015) 0.016 (0.017) -0.034 (0.028) -0.018 (0.013) -0.016 (0.016) -0.023 (0.026) 0.015 (0.013) 0.032 (0.016) -0.010 (0.020) 
Academy x (E = c-2) -0.004 (0.020) 0.013 (0.023) -0.034 (0.036) -0.033 (0.02) -0.031 (0.023) -0.044 (0.041) 0.028 (0.016) 0.044 (0.020) 0.010 (0.022) 
Academy x (E = c-1) -0.006 (0.027) 0.015 (0.032) -0.064 (0.048) -0.051 (0.028) -0.055 (0.032) -0.073 (0.051) 0.045 (0.020) 0.069 (0.026) 0.008 (0.035) 
Academy x (E = c) 0.025 (0.038) 0.034 (0.047) -0.038 (0.060) -0.042 (0.037) -0.059 (0.044) -0.060 (0.068) 0.067 (0.026) 0.093 (0.035) 0.022 (0.037) 
Academy x (E = c+1) 0.081 (0.047) 0.072 (0.060) 0.025 (0.071) 0.009 (0.045) -0.012 (0.054) -0.026 (0.082) 0.072 (0.031) 0.085 (0.041) 0.051 (0.050) 
Academy x (E = c+2) 0.088 (0.064) 0.097 (0.075) 0.008 (0.115) 0.039 (0.059) 0.030  (0.067) -0.007 (0.116) 0.049 (0.037) 0.067 (0.046) 0.015 (0.066) 
Academy x (E = c+3) 0.207 (0.066) 0.220 (0.081) 0.112 (0.110) 0.159 (0.066) 0.155  (0.069) 0.089 (0.137) 0.048 (0.051) 0.065 (0.068) 0.023 (0.075) 
P-value for test of 
joint significance (E 
=c-4 to c-1) 
0.938 0.880 0.455 0.236 0.218 0.600 0.203 0.091 0.567 
P-value for test of 
joint significance (E 
= c to c+3) 
0.002 0.053 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.050 0.074 0.098 0.770 
School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.896 0.881 0.937 0.921 0.912 0.948 0.599 0.575 0.677 
Sample Size 1955 1402 553 1955 1402 553 1955 1402 553 
Number of Treatment 
and Control Schools 220 158 62 157 158 
62 220 158 62 
 
 
Notes: E denotes event year and c is the year of conversion. Robust standard errors (clustered at the school level) are reported in parentheses. Control variable are percentage of year 
7 intake male, white-origin, free school meal status and special educational needs status. A pooled Academy x Post-Conversion (E = c to c+3) estimate and associated standard error 




1. Data on Academy Schools
We first identified all schools that became academies over the school years 2002/03 to 2010/11. 
Our sources for this are Department for Education extracts that give information on all 
academies that have opened or are in the process of doing so. The extract gives the opening date 
of the academy, its URN (a unique identifier for the school allowing us to identify it in various 
governmental data sources such as the National Pupil Database and the Pupil Level Annual 
Census data), DFE number (a second unique identifier combining school specific and local 
authority specific numbers) and the URN number of the predecessor school. 
Using performance tables data from the Department for Education (DfE) we match in 
predecessor school types.  The data gives 244 schools that became academies between the first 3 
academy openings in 2002/03 and those that gained academy status by September 2010 (the 
beginning of the academic school year). We omit those that were previously independent 
schools due to pupils in these schools not having exam information at KS4. Similarly, we omit 
new schools as they have no predecessor school.   
In order to have a balanced panel we focus on academies that have some form of predecessor 
school open from at least 1996 onwards. Any later and the school will not have KS4 results for 
2001. In order for our sample to be balanced for intake we exclude academies who do not enrol 
pupils in year 7. The final sample contains 106 treatment schools (those that opened  as 
academies prior to, or in, September 2008) and 114 control schools with observations ranging 
over the years 2000/01-2008/09. None of our control schools become academies during these 
sample years.  
2. Pupil Level Data
We use data from PLASC (pupil level annual schools census) and the NPD (national pupil 
database). The NPD contains information on all key stage 2 (KS2) and key stage 4 (KS4) 
exams sat at the end of primary and secondary school respectively. Each pupil is identified by a 
unique reference number and the data gives the unique URN of the school in which they sat the 
exam. While the NPD reports on pupils in examination years PLASC has a record for every 
pupil for each year that they are in the maintained school sector. PLASC data gives the pupil, 
year group and school as well as demographic variables such as ethnicity, gender, free school 
meal eligibility and special educational needs status. We can track pupils through secondary 
school using the unique pupil identifier. This identifier is common to the NPD enabling us to 
merge NPD and PLASC data. This gives a panel of pupils with their demographic information, 
their KS2 and KS4 test results and the school(s) that they attended from year 7 (first year of 
compulsory secondary education) through to year 11 (final year of compulsory education). We 
then extract those pupils who attended the 220 treatment and control schools at some point over 
the sample period. We can now see which schools pupils attended in every secondary 
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compulsory year of schooling26, their demographic information and their exams results at KS4 
and KS2. Our intake analysis focuses on those who enter as a year 7 student in 2000/01 – 
2008/09 while our results analysis focuses on those who sit exams, are ITT or receive exposure 
in one of our 106 treatment schools or sit exams in one of our 220 control schools over the same 
period. 
The raw data contains a small number of duplicate observations for pupils.27 Duplicates at the
level of KS2 results are easy to deal with as we randomly delete one entry when pupils records 
are duplicated in all aspects apart from the primary school they attended (as primary school does 
not matter to us). When there are two entries with differing exam scores we keep the record with 
the most information (i.e. if one entry has the pupil missing most exams while the second has 
scores for these exams we keep the latter).28 There are also small number of multiple records of
KS4 attainment for pupils. Our analysis focuses on the year 11 record giving us a dataset of 
pupils who have completed their GCSEs (as oppose to those who have sat some exams early). 
When multiple records exist in a single year we delete those whose scores are not included in 
national or school level calculations – often these are those who switch schools and so take 
exams in one school but are coded as attending another.29 In a few cases pupils are flagged as 
not to be included in the school level calculations (so their attainment would not be used to 
calculate performance tables school level data) despite the fact that their information is not 
duplicated and nothing appears to be wrong with their attainment data. We include these pupils 
in the final dataset. However, all results are robust to omitting these pupils.30
The sample sizes for year 7 and year 11 pupils are given in Table A1. 
Finally it is worth noting that PLASC does not cover years prior to 2002. For our observations 
before then we do still have NPD data on KS2 and KS4 performance (we have these going back 
to 1997 for KS4 and 1996 for KS2). Therefore these observations are missing all demographic 
covariates with the exception of gender. Similarly in our fake policy results the only covariates, 
aside from year dummies and school fixed effects, are pupil gender. This is why, in Table 9, we 
reproduce our main specification without covariates so as to make the fake and actual policy 
results comparable.  
For our the intake analysis we assume that those identified as being in year 8 in 2002 in PLASC 
were year 7 pupils in the same school the previous year – we therefore retain demographic 
variables for these pupils.   
26
 Strictly speaking this is not true. Some pupils enter the schooling system either from another country or from 
independent schools. We observe when the pupils enter but not precisely where they came from. These pupils are 
retained in our analysis.  
27
 That is, multiple records in a single year. 
28
 This may be the case when a pupil misses exams through illness and retakes at a later date. 
29
 Variables in the NPD identify whether the pupil’s achievement were used in school/national level calculations. 
30
 Unless otherwise stated all further robustness checks mentioned in this Appendix are available upon request form 
the authors.  
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3. Notes on Treatment and Clustering
Treatment for the pupil intake KS2 analysis is simple. A pupil is defined in treatment group if 
they enrol in an academy school in their first year of secondary school - year 7 – after 
conversion to an academy has occurred.   
Intention to treat for the KS4 performance analysis is defined as follows. For an individual in 
pre-enrolment year c-i (where c denotes conversion year) and academic year group j an 
individual is expected to sit their exams in c-i + (11-j). A person is then ITT if the preceding 
term is equal to c, c+1, c+2 or c+3. To see why an individual cannot be ITT in year c+4 note 
that the ‘biggest’ pre-enrolment year is c-1 and the ‘smallest’ academic year group is 7 thus the 
preceding term cannot exceed c+3. 
The exposure variable for Table 8 is defined cumulatively therefore we simply sum the number 
of academic years an individual spends in an academy school post conversion. ITT is then 
defined as above. We limit this sample to those who spend at most 4 years in an academy post 
conversion so as to be consistent with Tables 6 and 7.  
A final note relates to how we define ‘school’. For each of our treatment and control schools we 
assign a unique number.  It is possible that two pupils from different schools are given the same 
number should the two differing schools later become the same academy. We identify when 
schools merge by looking at linked schools in edubase (this is a Department For Education 
database of all open and closed maintained schools in England).  In one case a single school 
becomes two separate academies (North Westminster Community School splits into Paddington 
Academy and Westminster Academy in 2006). Pupils attending the predecessor school are 
randomly assigned one of the two numbers given to the two academies that open later. Students 
who leave the sample but are ITT or receive exposure are given a unique number equal to the 
school that they sit their KS4 exams in. In estimated specifications, standard errors are clustered 
on this unique number resulting in 1714 clusters in Tables 6 and 7 and 1720 in Table 8.  
4. Attainment Measures
The main variable in our analysis of intake is an average score across three subjects specific 
tests: English, Maths and Science.  Test scores are reported in two ways: firstly, a level from 2-5 
is awarded in each subject and secondly, a raw test score. The raw test score is out of 80 for 
science and is the sum of two separate science papers each marked out of 40 while the English 
test score is marked out of 100 and is composed of the sum of two separate test scores, each 
marked out of 50, in reading and writing. Finally math is composed of two marks out of 50 with 
one of the tests being in mental arithmetic. The levels are based upon these underlying test 
scores but are not always consistent. For instance, after an initial level is assigned after grading 
the test there may be a review of the pupil’s test score resulting in a higher or lower level being 
awarded even if the underlying raw test mark is not altered.  Similarly the mark required for any 
one level varies both between subjects and within subjects across years. For these reasons we 
use standardised raw test scores as our main dependent variable in KS2 regressions. 
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When pupils are not awarded a test mark or are performing at a level below the level of the test 
we award pupils a mark of 0. Those who miss the tests are excluded from our sample for the 
purposes of the KS2 regressions but are included in our KS4 regressions where we include a 
dummy for those who do not have a KS2 record or who miss KS2 exams. Our KS4 results are 
robust to re-running our regressions omitting those without a KS2 record and those whose 
scores are below test levels. 
The main KS4 qualification in the UK is the GCSE (General Certificate of Secondary 
Education). GCSEs are graded A*-G. The current points score calculations give an A* a score 



















Prior to this an A* was given a score of 8 and a G a score of 1 with scores going up in 



















As well as GCSEs there are a wide range of equivalent qualifications focusing on more 
vocational subjects. These include GNVQs and BTecs. Depending upon the type of equivalent 
these are often worth multiple GCSEs and are often graded as a combination of GCSE grades 
i.e. a distinction in an intermediate GNVQ is equivalent to gaining two GCSEs with one at grade 
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A and the other at grade A*.31 The points score given to the qualification reflects the underlying 
GCSE grades that it is based upon so that under the new scoring system the aforementioned 
qualification would be given a score of 110. 


















Scale used in the paper 
The points system we use addresses some of the concerns expressed pertaining to the 16-58 and 
1-8 scales used over the course of our sample.32 The non-linearity reflects the fact that it appears
hardest to jump from grades D to C and from A to A*.  
We cap points scores at best 8 qualifications. To do this we normalize raw point scores by their 
GCSE equivalent i.e. a qualification worth 4 GSCEs and 208 points (under the 16-58 scale) is 
normalized to be worth 52 points. We then convert these points to our new measure and rank 
them highest to lowest. We then add up the grade weightings (in terms of GCSEs), taking 
fractions of qualifications if need be, until we reach 8. All those in the top 8 are then multiplied 
through by their weight and summed to give the points score. 
Our decision to cap at 8 is motivated by two concerns.  Total points scores have the problem 
that pupils can appear to do well by entering many exams and performing poorly in them. 
Similarly using, for instance, 5 best means that those who focus very narrowly on a small set of 
exams may appear better than those who perform well over a larger selection of 
subjects/qualifications. Our decision to cap at 8 balances these two concerns. 
Finally, it is worth noting that our point measures create some notable discrepancies with the 
official method. For instance, an equivalent qualification worth two GCSEs graded CD is worth 
74 points under the 16-58 scale meaning that it is worth more than a A* at GCSE. Using our 
system such a qualification is worth 10 points (the sum of the points scores for grades of C and 
D) – the equivalent of a GCSE at grade A*. A further example is a BTEC that is worth 76 points 
on the old scale and equivalent to 4 GCSEs. This is the same as achieving grades of 2 Fs and 2 
31 Most equivalents are graded as pass, merit or distinction but the Department for Education equates these 
categories, combinations of, A*-G grades. 
32
 We are grateful to Tim Leunig and Mike Treadaway for very helpful correspondence on this. 
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Gs. In our system this is equivalent to a point score of 6. Thus our points mean the qualification 
is the same as getting a C at GCSE whereas the old measure means that the qualification is again 
worth more than an A*. In general our system reduces the relative points scores of equivalent 
qualifications compared to the official method. Despite this our results remain unchanged when 
using the (standardized) old (1-8) and new (16-58) points systems and when using total rather 
than capped scores.  
The threshold measures (results for which are reported in Tables A2-A4) are relatively simple. 
In these, an equivalent qualification is seen as being at least a C if its normalized points score is 
greater than or equal to that score given to a grade C at GCSE. Thus a qualification worth N 
GCSEs whose normalized point score is at least 6 equates to N qualifications of at least grade C.  
We present results for all our main performance specifications in Tables A2-A4 using different 
dependent variables.   
5. Ofsted Reports33
Ofsted is a government department that carries out inspections of maintained schools in England 
and Wales and reports to Parliament. Inspectors give schools minimal prior warning of 
inspection and proceed to inspect the school based upon a pre-set criteria before awarding the 
school and overall effectiveness rating.34 Overall effectiveness is based upon many criteria such
as the achievement of pupils, the effectiveness of management and the level of well-being and 
personal development of the pupils.  
Post 2005 there are 4 possible inspection ratings – outstanding, good, satisfactory and 
inadequate. Prior to 2005 the possible ratings given were excellent, very good, good, 
satisfactory, unsatisfactory, poor and very poor. To measure whether academies improve over 
time we equate the 7 ratings given prior to 2005 into the 4 categories given post 2005 in the 
following manner: 
Prior to 2005 Post 2005 
Excellent, very good Outstanding 
Good Good 
Satisfactory Satisfactory 
Unsatisfactory, poor, very poor Inadequate 
Our main interest is whether schools converting to academies are more likely to improve their 
rating relative to the control schools. 
33
 Throughout this and the other mechanisms section school refers to the variable school that we cluster on as 
described in the treatment section of the appendix – all mechanism regressions are performed at this level. 
34
 Overall effectiveness ratings have been awarded since 2000. 
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To do this we use Ofsted ratings for the years 2000-2010. We limit the sample to the years 
2000-2010 as post 2010 all the schools in our sample have converted to academies making any 
comparisons between converters and those yet to convert impossible.  
For our estimates we use the first and last inspections for each school in our sample. For 
treatment schools the first inspection must be prior to conversion while the last must be post 
conversion. These restrictions results in our sample of treatment school falling to 46 with the 
first three cohorts not represented in our sample at all. For controls schools we omit those that 
only have a single inspection over the period thus reducing our sample of control schools to 105. 
For this sample we define a variable equal to 0 if the school’s first inspection is worse than its 
last, 1 if the inspections are the same and 2 if the latter inspection is an improvement on the first. 
We use first and last inspections so that there is an equivalence in how we select relevant 
inspections for treatment and control schools. There are no cases when schools have multiple 
reports in the same year.  
As a robustness check we replicate the results using the following two conversions for Ofsted 
scores:  
Conversion 1 
Prior to 2005 Post 2005 
Excellent Outstanding 
Very good, good Good 
Satisfactory Satisfactory 
Unsatisfactory, poor, very poor Inadequate 
Conversion 2 
Prior to 2005 Post 2005 New Scale 
Excellent, very good Outstanding Good 
Good Good Good 
Satisfactory Satisfactory Good 
Unsatisfactory, poor, very poor Inadequate Bad 
Our results prove robust to these changes. 
6. Data on Mechanisms
As well as considering Ofsted reports we study mechanisms by looking at survey results from 
the Department for Education (2014), head teacher change and teacher turnover.  
We collect data on head teachers using edubase and match a head teacher to each of our schools 
for each year (excluding 2001 for which data are not available) in our sample. For each year we 
define a binary variable equal to 1 if this year’s head teacher is different from last years. When 
two schools merge we set this variable to 1 only if the head is not the head of either of the 
predecessors. When two separate schools are defined as being the same (with respect to the 
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clustering variable) we set this variable to 1 if either school change their head teacher in that 
year.  Controls in this linear model are the same as those reported in Table 10.  
For the teacher and pupil analysis we use data from the annual schools census. The data gives us 
the number of qualified and unqualified teachers at all maintained secondary schools for the 
years 2001-2009. We weight the total number of teachers, at the school level, by the number of 
pupils of compulsory secondary schooling age (11-15) relative to the total number of pupils in 
the school. This prevents a potentially spurious relationship between the number of teachers and 
academy conversion caused by many schools opening 6th forms post-conversion. The weighted
number of teachers, total pupils in compulsory secondary schooling along with the ratio of these 
two variables form the dependent variables in Table 14. Controls are the same as those reported 
in Table 11.  
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Additional Tables 
Table A1: Pupil Sample Sizes by Academy Cohort for KS2 and KS4 Analyses 
Key Stage 2 (Year 7) 
E = c-8 c-7 c-6 c-5 c-4 c-3 c-2 c-1 c c+1 c+2 c+3 Number of Conversions 
2002/03 441 398 532 537 588 523 3 
2003/04 964 1002 1070 1325 1327 1422 1342 7 
2004/05 269 264 245 265 340 385 375 379 2 
2005/06 1475 1497 1472 1460 1396 1625 1658 1772 1775 10 
2006/07 2608 2588 2591 2411 2358 2332 2363 2440 2654 15 
2007/08 5048 5080 5060 5057 4682 4742 4538 4772 5200 30 
2008/09 7623 7912 7904 7628 7102 6820 6396 6092 6191 39 
Key Stage 4 (Year 11 
E = c-8 c-7 c-6 c-5 c-4 c-3 c-2 c-1 c c+1 c+2 c+3 Number of Conversions 
2002/03 427 399 515 482 451 401 3 
2003/04 1020 1128 1115 1233 1068 1091 1108 7 
2004/05 278 263 302 301 265 256 261 280 2 
2005/06 1282 1418 1513 1529 1484 1430 1440 1452 1483 10 
2006/07 2341 2346 2520 2603 2499 2426 2390 2240 2282 15 
2007/08 4409 4673 4724 4920 4796 4821 4903 4876 4659 30 




Notes: E denotes event year and c is the year of conversion. Sample sizes and number of academy conversions by cohort for the KS2 and KS4 
analysis. The KS4 stop in E = c+3 to ensure that the post-academy new Year 7 intake are not included in the Year 11 samples ensuring 
treatment to conversion is for children enrolled in the school before conversion year E = c.  See the discussion in the main text of the paper for 
reasons for this chosen research design. 
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Table A2: Pupil Performance, Different Key Stage 4 Dependent Variables, Year 11, 2000/01 to 2008/09 
Key Stage 4 A*-C Key Stage 4 A*-C 
With English and Maths 
Key Stage 4 GCSE Points Only Key Stage 4 GCSE Equivalents 
OLS ITT IV OLS ITT IV OLS ITT IV OLS ITT IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
























































































































































































































School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.374 0.374 0.374 0.352 0.352 0.352 0.527 0.527 0.527 0.268 0.268 0.268 
Sample Size 362424 362424 362424 362424 362424 362424 362424 362424 362424 362424 362424 362424 
Number of Treatment and 
Control Schools 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
Notes: E denotes event year and c is the year of conversion. Robust standard errors (clustered at the school level) are reported in parentheses. Control variables included are 
the same as in Tables 6, 7 and 8. First stage results for the IV specifications are the same as those reported in Table 6. 
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Table A3: Pupil Performance, Different Key Stage 4 Dependent Variables, Year 11, 2000/01 to 2008/09, 
Community Predecessor School 
Key Stage 4 A*-C Key Stage 4 A*-C 
With English and Maths 
Key Stage 4 GCSE Points Only Key Stage 4 GCSE Equivalents 
OLS ITT IV OLS ITT IV OLS ITT IV OLS ITT IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
























































































































































































































School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.351 0.351 0.351 0.317 0.317 0.317 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.179 0.179 0.179 
Sample Size 258409 258409 258409 258409 258409 258409 258409 258409 258409 258409 258409 258409 
Number of Treatment and 
Control Schools 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 158 
Notes: As for Table A2 except first stage results for the IVspecifications are the same as those reported in Table 7. 
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Table A4: Pupil Performance, Different Key Stage 4 Dependent Variables, Year 11, 2000/01 to 2008/09, 
Non-Community Predecessor School 
Key Stage 4 A*-C Key Stage 4 A*-C 
With English and Maths 
Key Stage 4 GCSE Points Only Key Stage 4 GCSE Equivalents 
OLS ITT IV OLS ITT IV OLS ITT IV OLS ITT IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
























































































































































































































School Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.401 0.401 0.401 0.399 0.399 0.399 0.579 0.579 0.579 0.370 0.370 0.370 
Sample Size 104015 104015 104015 104015 104015 104015 104015 104015 104015 104015 104015 104015 
Number of Treatment and 
Control Schools 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 
Notes: As for Table A2 except first stage results for the IV specifications are the same as those reported in Table 7. 
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Table A5: Structure of Fake Policy Sample 
Key Stage 4 (Year 11) 
E = c-11 c-10 c-9 c-8 c-7 c-6 c-5 c-4 c-3 c-2 c-1 Number of Conversions 
2002/03 459 468 475 427 399 3 
2003/04 1072 1090 1086 1020 1128 1115 7 
2004/05 248 214 259 278 263 302 301 2 
2005/06 1011 995 1006 986 1069 1149 1200 1145 8 
2006/07 2313 2352 2310 2341 2346 2520 2603 2499 15 
2007/08 4308 4246 4378 4305 4561 4611 4796 4653 29 
2008/09 6655 6706 6635 6749 6858 7220 7227 7468 39 
 
Notes: E denotes event year and c is the year of conversion. Sample sizes and number of academy conversions by cohort for the 
fake policy sample used in columns (1) and (2) of Table 9. 
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